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How Parties Change

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Political parties are like other complex organizations (Panebianco 1988: xi) in leading a paradoxical existence. Once established, they tend to resist change, yet existence in changing environments makes survival dependent on adapting. While adaptation may be the result of external or internal forces and often occurs without deliberate planning, party actors may also be critical agents by adopting strategies to alter features of their organization and produce a better fit with the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Donaldson 1996).

Such competing tendencies in U.S. political parties led Lippman (1914: 26) to conclude that success promoted inertia and failure, innovation, and Lowi (1963) to support this conclusion with quantitative and historical data. Lowi further elaborates by showing that it is the minority party, long shut out from governing, that innovates. He considers it likely that similar tendencies may be found in multi-party systems in the innovative actions of the second minority party (Lowi 1963: 571).

Starting with the assumption that relegation to minority status over multiple consecutive elections is the stimulus to party change in both Canada and the United States leads to the question of how change takes place. I focus on party actors and treat the strategies they adopt to meet fundamental problems as mechanisms for generating change. I select three relevant strategies: how resources are mobilized with respect to partisan activists, voters, and money; how parties identify and make use of an appealing and overarching message to create boundaries and recruit support; and how activities are coordinated through leadership and across geopolitical levels. Change leading to electoral victory is represented by increases in intensive and extensive mobilization efforts, a new or reworked emphasis on ideological appeals, and the assertion of centralized leadership and control.

This approach, applied to the Republican, Conservative, and Democratic parties during the periods preceding the elections of 1980, 2006, and 2008, when, as former out-parties, they took office, highlights similar organizational responses to changing circumstances despite major differences between the two countries' political systems and parties. In evaluating how change strategies contribute both to electoral victory and to potentially negative outcomes, I also suggest how strategies used by their opponents may provide lessons for the current situation of the Liberals in Canada and Republicans in the United States.

Party organizations' readiness to move ahead when opportunities are ripe for changing their fortunes requires them to make anticipatory structural alterations affecting the mobilization of resources. Party actors need to be willing to adopt new organizational practices with regard to methods of fund-raising and techniques for enlisting support. In the case of the Republicans this was demonstrated as early as the late 1930s when, despite the party's serious electoral weakness, a National Republican Finance Committee was set up to centralize financing of the RNC and the two campaign committees. Later, into the 1960s, the Republicans moved ahead of the Democrats in the size and sophistication of their national party organs (Cotter and Bibby 1980). By 1979, the Republicans had introduced computerization so that voters could be classified into more effective targets (Kayden and Mahe 1985: 79).

Chances of victory are now enhanced when parties deploy organizational tools that bring in small donors tied to their local setting and made to feel that their contributions make them a genuine part of the party. When Howard Dean became chairman of the DNC he introduced new approaches to fund-raising through on-line appeals; outreach to new donors, including small donors; and matching donations, in a sense catching up to Republican tactics (Corrado and Varney 2007). Similar efforts are needed to enlist and coordinate volunteers willing to work on behalf of the party and its candidates. For example, the new Conservative Party, the result of a merger between the old Progressive Conservative Party (PC) and the regionally-based Canadian Alliance, itself an outgrowth of the earlier Reform Party, was quick to use direct mail, phone and internet appeals. In this regard the Conservatives carried over Reform and the Alliance's social movement-like style in mobilizing activists and supporters as well as becoming, at the same time, more professionalized (Young et al. 2007). In all three cases, such focused and professionalized fund-raising and recruitment was critical.

Party transformation also requires cultural change through new messages that lay out what the party stands for and where it expects to take the country. These messages provide a convincing rationale for participation and a means of coordination. The Republicans found it in their version of conservatism, beginning with the Goldwater candidacy, extending through Reagan's (Schwartz 1990), and apparent in Gingrich's

Contract with America. By the 2006 election, the Conservatives were able to refine their message, emphasizing a pragmatic approach to principles associated with the PCs and playing down the more ideological thrust inherited from Reform (Stephenson 2006; Flanagan 2009). Although the Democrats had done little to hone a consistent message before going into the 2008 election, that altered when Obama made "change" his theme. Even though it was weak on specifics, it was still evocative enough to unify those already attracted to the Democrats and to mobilize the indifferent (Lemann 2009).

For the current out-parties in both countries, and especially the Canadian Liberals, attention to broader-based fund-raising will be an important step in changing their current situation. The same is true for the need to harness a broad base of participants who can be engaged in the party beyond election periods. Having already learned these lessons, the Democrats are currently attempting to ensure that the enthusiasm generated by the last election continues among grass root workers through web-based contacts and parlor meetings.

All three cases demonstrate that decision-makers need to display a willingness to move beyond traditional bases of support through targeting and outreach programs. In the earlier period the Republicans disrupted older partisan loyalties by going after Southerners, Catholics, and working class voters. In Canada, the Conservatives looked for ways to appeal to voters outside the western provinces, including those Quebeckers already moving away from the Liberals. And the Democrats showed their unwillingness to accept the designation of red states or even the Republican proclivities of Protestant evangelicals (Evers 2008). When change is needed, a party can neither take its traditional support for granted nor concede large groups to the opposition.

While all of this may sound self-evident, in reality it was not. Only in facing the 2008 election did the Democrats seriously begin building data banks of voters (Kuhn 2008). At the same time they moved ahead of the Republicans in exploiting the relatively inexpensive means provided by the internet for identifying and contacting supporters. The Liberals, meanwhile, seemed incapable of making the kind of efforts needed to restrain the melting away of their long-time supporters.

By relating mobilization to party efforts I lay responsibility on national party organs to monitor sources of support. The Conservatives appear to be conscious of the need to do so by constraining the influence of their anti-Quebec and evangelical components. Such efforts may be more difficult in the United States, where political parties have traditionally been more open to organized groups. Once inside, the objective of these new entrants is to co-opt the party machinery for their own interests, including the shaping of party policies. This process of entry and takeover describes the activities of the Religious Right in the Republican Party, which formed the basis of mutually beneficial relationships over a long period. On the down side, however, once such a coherent group comes to represent a party's core through an uncompromising commitment undeterred even by electoral setbacks, this can make the group's very presence a deterrent to the recruitment of others.

This emphasis on organization, both in its structural aspects and its cultural character, does not deny importance to individual actors who, on the one hand, make use of existing structural arrangements and call on the organization's cultural tool kit, and, on the other, create new structures and cultural responses in the face of changing opportunities. Especially critical as agents of change are those with the potential to become presidents and prime ministers. Once in power, as the head of the party in its governing role, leadership assumes a symbolic character, tapping into the multiple ways in which presidents and prime ministers become the heads of their nations both at home and abroad separately from issues of partisanship. The challenge comes with crisis, when the leader, prepared to lead his or her party from opposition to victory, must call upon another set of skills, ones that enable him or her to boldly affirm possessing the personal attributes that will solve the country's ills. Although the full-fledged charisma associated with founders of social movements is unlikely to emerge in long-established parties, party leaders may be empowered by what Panebianco calls "situational charisma." That occurs when stressful situations encourage people,

regardless of existing partisanship, to follow any leader who promises solutions. From the three cases cited, it is possible to attribute such charismatic qualities to Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama. Both made their appeals when competing, first in their own party against opponents with less attractive personae or agendas, and then against unpopular presidents during times of severe domestic and international difficulties.

By not including Conservative leader Stephen Harper in the same category with his U.S. counterparts, the question implied is whether the Canadian political system makes such party leaders less relevant. In the United States, the president is a national figure by definition, beginning with his election on a nationwide ballot and his constitutional status as commander-in-chief. In Canada, a potential prime minister runs in a single local constituency as a candidate for Parliament and does not attain the highest office until requested to form a government. Yet, once in office, there is a marked divergence of roles. A prime minister with a majority government has almost unchecked powers in a political setting where parliamentary supremacy has been the rule. Moreover, by his control, along with Cabinet, over the policy agenda, the prime minister is clearly the party leader in a way more difficult for a president to achieve. Yet, to Clarke et al. (2009: 12; 48), the heads of state are equally important in both countries when viewed from their impact on the electorate. Through the images leaders evoke, they guide voters in making party choices.

What these cases strongly suggest is that having a visionary leader is one of the attributes that helps coordinate changes to enable a party to come from behind and attain victory. In the United States, such leadership is probably more crucial for the unifying symbolism it can lend to a national campaign (Alexander 2009). To rebuild their party, the Republicans will surely need to find such a symbolic figure who brings along a persuasive message. For the Liberals, the character of the leader who will bring them back to a revitalized and victorious party may not be so evident. Neither the message nor its carrier in the last election were powerful enough to overcome internal weaknesses. For the future, the Liberals will need someone who can rely on personal qualities and an appealing message to mobilize support from potential internal competitors, party stalwarts, and ordinary voters with the primary objective of rebuilding the party.

In the end, there needs to be sufficient coordination to ensure that all the organizational elements operate in a unified fashion to ensure effective mobilization of financial and human resources and spread of the party's message. It is for this reason that I assign so much importance to centralized control achieved through structural arrangements and leadership resting on a forceful message. To meet competing pressures from local settings and unexpected issues means simultaneously taking direction from professional staff and engaging the participation of enthusiastic volunteers. Coming from behind to produce a major electoral victory is no easy task, no matter how much the environment has altered and the party in office has become vulnerable.

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FROM HEADQUARTERS

Letter from the Chair — October, 2009

Dear Colleagues:

I write to you as the new president of APSA's organized section on *Political Organizations and Parties* to say hello, to thank you for selecting me, and to open a discussion about some of the issues facing our section.

To begin with, I want you to know that *POP* is in excellent shape. Russ Dalton, my immediate predecessor, did a superb job, and he has helped make the transition from his presidency to mine a smooth one. Moreover, *POP* will continue to be served by a fine group of officers. We have a very strong Executive Committee, comprising many talented people. I am grateful to Holly Brasher for agreeing to stay on as Secretary/Treasurer and to John Green for his continuing editorship of our newsletter, *VOX POP*.

In addition, we recently entered into an association with the journal *Party Politics*, which brings significant benefits to *POP* members and journal subscribers. We also have an outstanding website. I urge you to visit it at http://www.apsanet.org/~pop/. There you will find links to section news and events, past editions of *VOX POP,* the website for *Party Politics,* a listing of section award winners, and a collection of syllabi for courses on political parties, elections, and interest groups. There also is a link that will take you to some useful internet resources. Finally, the website provides contact information for me and *POP's* other officers.

While all is well in our section, that does not mean there are no new issues for consideration. Increasing *POP's* membership and attendance at section panels at major conferences should be a focus of some of our efforts because it would increase opportunities for section members to present their research.

Another effort we might undertake is to come to a newer understanding of exactly which subjects fit into our section's domain. *POP* originated from a merger of the political organizations and parties subfields. Since then, *POP* members have done cutting edge research in such areas as party organizations, interest groups, money and politics, election campaigns, and political reform—to name a few. Most section members have focused their research on the American scene. However, our association with *Party Politics* is likely to result in many scholars with expertise in other democracies joining our ranks. This should facilitate the testing of hypotheses developed in the American setting abroad and the testing of hypothesis developed abroad in the U.S. It also could result in more comparative research on political organizations and parties. Just as important, it should create some wonderful opportunities for international collaboration. As our membership branches out in new

I welcome your thoughts on these and other issues.

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FROM HEADQUARTERS
AWARD CITATIONS

Samuel Eldersveld Award, a scholar whose lifetime professional work has made an outstanding contribution to the field of political organizations and parties.

Recipient: Jeffrey Berry, Tufts University

Award Committee: Kay L. Schlozman (Chair), John Aldrich and Clyde Wilcox.

A committee composed of John Aldrich, Clyde Wilcox, and Kay L. Schlozman (Chair) of the Political Organizations and Parties Section of the American Political Science Association is delighted to honor Jeffrey Berry of Tufts University with the 2009 Samuel J. Eldersveld Award, which is given annually to a scholar whose lifetime professional work has made an outstanding contribution to the field. Prof. Berry's photo on his department's Web site shows him in what must be a meeting. Characteristically, this author of a series of works that shed light on the organizations that are active in American politics—the kinds of causes they represent, the tactics they use, the way they are affected by the legal, institutional, and behavioral context in which they operate, and the extent of their impact—seems to be listening and thinking.

To highlight a few of the works in this seemingly unending stream, we might mention *Lobbying for the People*, the inquiry that first drew scholarly attention to the increasing significance of citizens groups advocating on behalf of public goods; *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (with Kent E. Portney and Ken Thomson), which won both the Gladys Kammerer Award and the Best Book Award from the Urban Politics Section; *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups* which won the Aaron Wildavsky Award from the Policy Studies Section; and *A Voice for Nonprofits* (with David F. Arons), which won the Leon D. Epstein Award from the Political Organizations and Parties Section.

It would hardly be surprising if next year's APSA meeting found Prof. Berry collecting another award—this time for *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why* (with Frank R. Baumgartner, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech), which was published this summer by the University of Chicago Press. This path breaking work rises to the challenge that daunts most students of input-side politics by penetrating the black box of policy making and drawing empirical links between organized interest advocacy and public outcomes. *Lobbying and Policy Change*, which calls into question much of the received wisdom about organized interest influence, has the hallmarks of Prof. Berry's style: a willingness to undertake prodigious feats of data collection and a clear eye on the foundational questions underlying the systematic study of politics—*Who Governs?* and *Politics: Who Gets What? When? How?*

Leon D. Epstein Award, honoring a book published in the last two calendar years that makes an outstanding contribution to research and scholarship on political organizations and parties.

Recipient: Larry Bartels, Princeton University—
**   *Unequal Democracy***

Award Committee: Marc Hetherington, Vanderbilt University (Chair); Dara Strolovitch, University of Minnesota; and Bruce Larson, Gettysburg College.

The Epstein Award committee received scores of nominations for this year's top spot. And, in any normal year, several of the books would have been strong enough to win. Paul Frymer's book *Black and Blue* or Marty Cohen and his long list of co-author's book *The Party Decides* are two such examples. But this was no normal year. This year, Larry Bartels penned *Unequal Democracy*, a remarkable book for many reasons.

First, it asks and answers *the* key question about politics: Lasswell's famous "Who Gets What, When, and How?" Rarely has a book in our

discipline answered this question so clearly, and, as such, is so normatively important. The opinions of the well off matter a lot more than the not well off.

Second, it is daring. Even though scholars are dismissed by those outside the discipline as being partisans and ideologues, it is often the case in our professional work that we adopt a norm of neutrality that prohibits us from making arguments that we worry might be seen as partisan or ideological. Larry does not shy away from following the data where it takes him, demonstrating that income inequality grows during Republican administrations and not during Democratic ones.

Third, it is accessibly written and cogently argued. This is such a rare combination in the profession. Non-experts no doubt can consume this work without much of a struggle. But this remarkable level of accessibility does not come at the cost of rigor or substance.

That this award comes in the 10th anniversary of his Center, the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, is fitting. Larry has done so much to help along the careers of so many people over these 10 years. It would be nice to at least think that the Center has given something back to Larry, in helping him, even if just a little bit, to craft this award winning book.

Jack Walker Award, honoring an article published in the last two calendar years that makes an outstanding contribution to research and scholarship on political organizations and parties.

Co-Recipients: Michael Tomz and Robert Van Houweling, 'Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice,' *American Political Science Review*, **(2008), 102:3, 303-18.**

Award committee: Michael Laver, New York University (Chair); Bonnie Meguid, Rochester University; and Kevin Easterling, UC Riverside.

This paper presents results of a survey experiment, elegantly designed to provide systematic empirical evidence about the extent to which voters in two-party systems use one of three types of decision rule: Downsian *proximity voting*; *discounting*, according to which perceived party position are weighted averages of announced positions and the status quo; and *directional voting*, where voters also value candidates' intensity as proposed by Rabinowitz and Macdonald.

Empirical research to estimate the extent to which voters use these different rules has been beset by problems of endogeneity, measurement, and observational equivalence. The authors' solution is, first, to specify careful settings in which rival assumptions imply different observed behaviors and, second, to generate these settings systematically in a survey experiment. Rather than randomly assigning candidate positions in these experiments, the authors condition such positions on respondent's revealed ideal points. This interactive design massively increases efficiency; without it, only about three percent of cases would generate critical tests needed to distinguish between assumptions. The design of the experiment also incorporates innovative statistical tests of the treatment effects, including a neat way to estimate the "error" rate with which respondents chose one party when they "should", given their decision rule, chose the other.

Given the clarity of their research design, the authors offer a clear and informative answer to the question they pose. They estimate tha about 60 percent of citizens use proximity rules, about a quarter choose candidates after discounting their announced positions, while about 15 use directional logic. The authors go on to break down results by: level of education (higher education makes people likely to be proximity voters and less likely to be directional); partisanship (partisans are more likely to be directional voters); and strength of ideology (strong ideology is associated with proximity voting). The authors find that ideological centrists tend to prefer discounting over directionalism, and this implies that moderate voters tend to draw public policy back to the center whenever it deviates toward an extreme.

This result is more generally relevant to the study of political parties, since any model of party competition inevitably makes assumptions about decision rules used by voters. And the results are of great practical and social importance, informing us of optimal strategies for candidates under different circumstances, and disentangling the processes of accountability that go to the core of democratic legitimacy.

Emerging Scholar Award, honoring a scholar who has received his or her Ph.D. within the last seven years and whose career to date demonstrates unusual promise.

Recipient: Hans Noel, Georgetown University

Award Committee: Miki Caul Kittilson (Chair), Arizona State University; Scott Desposato, University of California, San Diego; and Michele Swers, Georgetown University.

The committee was delighted to present the Emerging Scholar Award to Hans Noel. He is currently a Robert Wood Johnson fellow at the University of Michigan, and is an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, having received his Ph.D. from UCLA in 2006. Hans has already won a POP/Party Politics Award for Best Paper (2005) for "Ideology, Parties and the Origins of the Anti-Slavery Coalition." Similarly, he has also won other APSA paper awards for separate co-authored papers. In addition, he contributed a chapter, "Methodological Perspectives on Studying Parties", to the *Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups*. Hans has co-authored a book entitled *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform*, which was published in 2008 by the University of Chicago Press and has received much positive coverage. He has also published several articles in top-notch journals. His research project in progress, "The Coalition Merchants: The Ideological Roots of the Civil Rights Realignment" is promising and addresses some of the most fundamental questions about political parties such as whether there is some core set of ideas that holds parties together and under what conditions these ideas change.

Best Pop Paper Award, honoring the best paper on a POP panel at the preceding APSA annual meeting.

Co-Recipients: Richard Skinner, Seth Masket, and David Dulio, '527 Committees and the Political Party Network.'

Award Committee: Frederick Boehmke (Chair), University of Iowa; Sona Golder, Florida State University; and Eric Schickler, UC Berkeley.

This paper studies networks of political parties among party activists and campaign professionals. It brings a more detailed set of data and a more sophisticated methodological approach to study an age-old question of party structure, both formal and informal. The authors gather data on leadership positions and employees for the top 20 highest spending 527 Committees in the 2004 election. They develop an extensive list of officers, directors, trustees, and key employees by gathering data from these 527 groups' filings with the IRS. In order to determine connections between those individuals and party organizations, the authors researched their employment and association histories. The resulting data are used to construct networks of associations between 527s, party organizations, and other political organizations. A number of interesting findings emerge. For example, while the resulting network is dominated by Democratic organizations, there is a surprising amount of partisan overlap. Further, 527s appear to be quite central in the political network, sometimes even more central than party's own national committee organizations.

SCHOLARLY PRECINCTS
Campaign and Party Finance in Established Democracies

Karl-Heinz Nassmacher,
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For liberal democracies party competition is a defining feature. The founding fathers (among them Generals Washington and de Gaulle) did not like it that way, but it happened. The study of political parties, their functions and their resources, is a long established field of political science. Among the resources deployed in political competition funding tends to be less prominent than organization and personnel. Members and volunteers, party workers and party staff, even their substitution by political consultants, have been studied in detail.

Pick up a copy of Duverger[1] or Epstein,[2] and you will find lots of comparative information on such items. However, if you happen to look for the resourcing of party activity, even Janda tends to become highly selective. Just two of his basic variables (sources of funds, allocation of funds) are related to funding issues.[3] The recent Handbook of Party Politics edited by Katz and Crotty[4] covers all aspects of party activity in 45 chapters. Just one of them (chapter 12) discusses party finance;[5] two others touch upon party funding via regulation. For many democracies there seems to be no empirical evidence on the raising and spending of money by parties and candidates. A different impression emerges from Scarrow's review of the literature: Various multi-country studies contain detailed information on funding rules and practices.[6]

Obviously different terms, "campaign funds" as well as "party finance", identify money that is spent for purposes of political competition. Such funds can be expended on individual election campaigns (for any public office) or on the maintenance of a party organization (nationally and in the field). This includes all funds raised from individual citizens, interested money (like businesses or trade unions), public subsidies or—occasionally even—corrupt exchanges.

When Pollock[7] and Overacker[8] started to analyze the role of money in politics, they started in the U.S. and they started with money spent in order to influence the outcome of a (federal) election. Their take-off point has dominated perception of the topic ever since. However, "campaign funds," the subject heading for all books dealing with money in politics used by the Library of Congress, is too narrow for cross-national analysis.

Heidenheimer, a researcher of European origin, added the term "party finance". Europeans may have applauded this enlargement of scope. Heard tried to bridge perceptions between U.S. and foreign scholars. His broader term, "the costs of democracy,"[9] highlights the expense side of the subject, and did not stick either.

The international community of scholars turned to "political finance", a concept that integrates campaign and party funding. Heidenheimer,[10] Paltiel,[11] Alexander,[12] Gunlicks[13] and Pinto-Duschinsky[14] advanced cross-national comparisons. Even the internet reflects the different usage of terms. Google counts 3.8 million hits in a search for "campaign finance", and just 58,000 for "party finance".

Spending on Campaigns and by Parties

The concept of political party helps to identify the manifold Orbit of competitors and to add up the items of expenditure. Although most dimensions of political spending (a variety of campaigns, a party organization with national headquarters and local chapters) are common to all democracies, detailed features are quite specific. The mix of voluntary party workers and paid staff, the expenses for rented offices, publicity and communication vary considerably. Our knowledge of political spending has improved much during recent decades, although it is still limited to a few countries.[15] Most of them are either from the Anglo-Saxon orbit or from continental Western Europe. Among the democracies for which the costs of political competition can be established, there is an impressive spread of per capita spending totals. Austria, Israel, Italy, and Japan stand out as big spenders. Australia, the U.K. and the Netherlands display a moderate level of party expenses. Many democracies (including the U.S.) operate at an intermediate level of political spending.[16] Most countries have not changed their level of political spending in about five decades.[17]

Some features stand out to indicate potential causes for the spread: The earlier popular government has been established and the more a country can afford economically, the less likely it is to spend much on its democracy. Party activity in (majoritarian) Anglo-Saxon style democracies is less expensive than it is in the multi-party (consensus) democracies of continental Western Europe (and in non-western countries). Generous government subsidies and prevailing corruption are additional factors that induce higher political spending.[18]

In the two biggest democracies of our time (India and the U.S.) the bulk of all political money is spent for campaigning (between 75 and 90 percent of the total).[19] However, not even in Canada or the U.K., two other important Anglo-Saxon democracies, campaigns devour a comparable share of all political funds. In continental Western Europe money is used mostly to pay for the routine operation of parties on the ground and in the nation's capital.

1 Duverger, Maurice. *Political Parties.* Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. 3rd ed., London: Methuen & Co., 1967 (first published: Paris: Armond Colin, 1951).

2 Epstein, Leon D. *Political Parties in Western Democracies.* New Brunswick NJ: Transaction, 2nd. ed. 1980.

3 Janda, Kenneth. *Political Parties.* A Cross National Survey. London: Macmillan, 1980, pp. 91/92, 111/112; cf. also Janda, Kenneth. *Comparative Political Parties Data, 1950-1962.* Ann Arbor MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1979, pp. 148-153, 189-191.

4 Katz, Richard/ Crotty, William (eds.). *Handbook of Party Politics,* London: Sage, 2006.

5 Green, John. 'On the cusp of change: Party finance in the United States.' In: Katz/ Crotty, ibid., pp. 134-145.

6 Scarrow, Susan. 'Political Finance in Comparative Perspective'. In: *Annual Review of Political Science,* vol. 10, 2007, p. 196 (table 1).

7 Pollock, James K. *Party Campaign Funds.* New York, NY: Knopf, 1926.

8 Overacker, Louise. *Money in Elections.* New York, NY: MacMillan, 1932.

9 Heard, Alexander: The Costs of Democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1960.

10 Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 'Comparative Party Finance - Notes on Practices and Towards a Theory'. In: *Journal of Politics,* vol. 25, no. 4, 1963, pp. 790-811 and Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 'The Major Modes of Raising, Spending and Controlling Political Funds During and Between Election Campaigns.' In: Heidenheimer, Arnold (ed.). Comparative Political Finance. *The Financing of Party Organizations and Election Campaigns.* Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1970.

11 Paltiel, Khayyam Z. 'Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms'. In: Butler, David/ Penniman Howard R./ Ranney, Austin (eds.): *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections.* Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981, pp. 138-172.

12 Cf. Alexander, Herbert E. Financing the 1960 Election. Princeton, NJ: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1962; Alexander, Herbert E. Financing Politics. Money, Elections and Political Reform. Washington, DC: *Congressional Quarterly Press,* 4th ed. 1992 (for comparisons in time) and Alexander, Herbert E. (ed.). *Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Alexander, Herbert E./ Shiratori, Rei (eds.). *Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994 (for comparisons among countries).

13 Gunlicks, Arthur B. (ed.). *Campaign and Party Finance in North America and Western Europe.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

14 Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. 'Financing Politics: A Global View'. In: *Journal of Democracy,* vol. 13, no. 4, 2002, pp. 69-85.

15 For details see Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. The Funding of Party Competition. Political Finance in 25 Democracies. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2009, p. 115.

16 Nassmacher, ibid., pp. 119/20.

17 Heidenheimer, ops. cit. 1963 and 1970; Heard, op. cit.; Penniman, Howard R. 'U.S. Elections: Really a Bargain?' In: *Public Opinion,* vol. 7, no. 2, 1984, pp. 51-53; Nassmacher, op. cit., p. 118.

18 Nassmacher, ibid., pp. 122-4, 131-2, 142-6.

19 Cf. Sridharan, Eswaran. 'Electoral Finance Reform: The Relevance of International Experience.' In: Chand, Vikram K. (ed.), *Reinventing Public Service Delivery in India. Selected Case Studies,* New Delhi et al.: Sage Publications, 2006, pp. 363-388 and Magleby, David B./ Corrado, Anthony Patterson, Kelly D. (eds.). *Financing the 2004 Election.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.

Growing electorates and inflationary trends have made many observers believe that a cost explosion has occurred.[20] Paid TV advertising is considered the principle villain far beyond the Anglo-Saxon orbit. However, there is "no evidence of an important relationship between TV costs and the vote shares of incumbents."[21] New campaign technology is applied – wherever the funds to pay for it are at hand. Into growing numbers of salaried experts, be they highly skilled professionals (consultants) or full-time party organizers, competing parties, candidates and PACs sink a lot of money. This happens because – due to Citizens' generosity, public subsidies or corrupt exchanges – they can afford to do so.

This supply-side theory of expenditure can be demonstrated for Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. Current levels of political spending fall short of earlier peaks. In the U.S. GDP deflated per capita expenses peaked in 1912 and 1940. Today they are much lower and declining since 1968.[22] This is quite in line with earlier observations made by Pollock, Overacker and Heard.[23]

Political Revenue for Parties and Campaigns

The financial support of policies, politicians and parties is an expression of economic and political freedom, not necessarily the consequence of influence peddling or corrupt exchanges. Individual donations in small amounts provide about half of the total funds raised in the U.S. and Canada, much less of it in Germany and the U.K. Only in the Netherlands and Switzerland European politicians can collect a comparable share from signed-up party members. Even the traditional left-of-centre mass-membership parties raise less than a quarter of their funds from this source.

Popular financing can be an important source of political revenue, but it is not a constant and reliable one. Just like voters, party members and small donors are a volatile sort of citizens. Grass-roots revenue will never suffice to cover all costs of politics. However, this source of funding can supply large amounts if parties and candidates put in some organizational effort.

Various alleys have been explored successfully to glean grass-roots funding: recruiting party members, lotteries, direct mail, internet or neighborhood solicitation, and social events at the local level. A public benefit program (preferably matching funds or tax credits) can ensure that political fund-raising will not fall victim to competing NGOs or charities.

The free flow of money into political competition is both, a hazard and a necessity of democratic politics. Because plutocratic financing, influence peddling, political graft and corrupt exchanges happen, the flow of political funds needs transparency. Money from the business community is no longer a real danger in most democracies. "Corporate donations" have declined, mostly because they have been substituted by public subsidies. Due to PAC money and independent expenditures the U.S. may be the most important exception to that rule. Public disincentives to discourage the flow of interested money into political competition (disclosure, limits and bans) reinforce this trend.

In general, public subsidies are neither a mere stop-gap nor an all-purpose solution to funding problems. As with any other kind of funding, specific problems accompany them (such as rules for access and distribution). Some countries apply rules to enforce the legitimacy of this source of political revenue (especially the matching principle), others stipulate a specified responsibility for transparency. In combination with other sources of revenue as well as rules to enforce fairness and legitimacy, state aid is a means of political funding that very few established Democracies forgo. Not even the U.S. and the U.K. do so completely.

Party organizations, caucuses and/or candidates are the recipients of public support. There is indirect funding (i.e., subsidies-in-kind and tax benefits) as well as cash aid. If subsidies are allocated, access needs to be fair and distribution takes party size into account. The significance of public subsidies can be judged from two points of view: that of the party treasurer and that of the average taxpayer. Taxpayers in Europe and non-western democracies provide higher amounts towards party activity than do their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Many party headquarters cover between 40 and 60 percent of their annual budget by public grants.

Impacts of Political Money

People who spend more and more money on political competition may expect that this will have some sort of impact. With a commercial style of campaigning, money seems to be much more relevant today than in the good old days of mass parties and machine politics. Money buys access to communication (newspapers, radio, television, billboards, telephones, mailings).

Statistical analysis in examining campaign finance has been greatly enhanced by the use of computers and the wealth of available data. For the 1979 Canadian election Isenberg found evidence of a clear relationship between coming first and spending most, and he confirmed this for the 1980 election.[24] Using more data and different modeling Jacobson observed "a clear connection between campaign spending and election results" in the U.S. [25] However, in English constituencies Johnston found no indication "that the level of spending is a major, let alone a dominant influence on the result."[26]

Based on spending data and election results spending is frequently analyzed as the cause of voting. However, it may well be that donating is a means of support and a bellwether of expected success whereas spending is just a consequence of cash-at-hand, not the cause of success.[27] Thus a simple correlation between political money and electoral success is obviously misleading. Campaign money is most productive where other factors make winning possible. If so, it is definitely the voters' choice and not the politicians' cash that will decide the outcome of an election.[28]

If money is a means to succeed in political competition, the party, which is able to spend the most, should be the winner—at least most of the time. Wherever enough data is available, this plausible hypothesis does not stand the test of reality. A skewed distribution of disposable funds between the major parties in Britain and Germany and between two minor parties in Germany has not determined their ups and downs in voter support.[29]

The same applies to the more sophisticated theory that public subsidies lead to an ossification of the party system. New parties have successfully entered party competition in many democracies. Established parties have lost and gained electoral support with and without state aid. An arrested distribution of power between parties of government and parties in opposition has occurred solely in Japan, but not in Austria, Germany, Israel, Spain or Sweden – which (due to a high level and long duration of public subsidies) are the likeliest candidates for such suspicion.[30]

In general, a shift of party activity towards professional operation at the centre and in the field can be observed. As a consequence the distribution of power within party organizations will continue to move towards all units that wield the purse-strings, especially those which are able to raise additional funds – be it from individual supporters, corporate donors, public funds, corrupt exchanges or by assessment of office-holders.[31]

20 Krouwel, Andrae. *The Catch-all Party in Western Europe 1945-1990. A Study in Arrested Development.* Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, dissertation, 1999, pp. 86/87 referring to Katz, Richard S./ Mair, Peter (eds.). *Party Organizations. A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies. 1960-90.* London: Sage, 1992, tables E.6.

21 Ansolabehere, Stephen/ Gerber, Alan S./ Snyder, James M. 'Does TV Advertising Explain the Rise of Campaign Spending? A Study of Campaign Spending and Broadcast Advertising Prices in U.S. House Elections the 1990s and the 1970s', 2001. www.mit.edu/faculty/snyder/files, p. 22.

22 Nassmacher, op.cit., p. 185.

23 Pollock, Overacker, Heard, ops. cit.

24 Isenberg, Seymour. 'Can You Spend Your Way into the House of Commons?' In: *Optimum*, vol. 11, no. 1, 1980, pp. 33, 35; Isenberg, Seymour. 'Spend and Win? Another Look at Federal Elections Expenses'. In: *Optimum*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1981, p. 8.

25 Jacobson, Gary C. Money in *Congressional Elections*. New Haven: Yale University, 1980, p. 51.

26 Johnston, Ronald J. *Money and Votes. Constituency Campaign Spending and Election Results.* London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 179; Johnston, Ronald J./ Pattie, Charles J. 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British General Elections'. In: *Party Politics*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1995, pp. 261-273.

27 Nassmacher, op. cit., pp. 338/9.

28 Casas-Zamora, Kevin. *Paying for Democracy: Political Finance and State Funding for Parties.* Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2005, p. 13.

29 Nassmacher, op.cit., p. 344.

30 Nassmacher, ibid., pp. 350, 355/6.

31 Nassmacher, ibid., pp. 379, 386.

SCHOLARLY PRECINCTS
Papers of Interest
2009 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting

'Votes, Preference Estimates, and Party Power.' James S.C. Battista, SUNY, University at Buffalo and Jesse T. Richman, Old Dominion University.

'Inter-institutional Bargaining, Partisanship, and Control of the Appropriations Process in American Government.' William Ewell, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

'Does Power Pay? Party Control and PAC Contributions in the American States.' Justin Kirkland, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Virginia H. Gray, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; and David Lowery, University of Leiden.

'Examining the Consequences of Instability in State Government Partisan Composition.' Carl E. Klarner, Indiana State University.

'Policy Feedback and Voter Turnout.' Tetsuya Matsubayashi, University of North Texas.

'Maligned Youth? How Exit Polls Systematically Misrepresent Youth Turnout.' Joshua M. Pasek, Stanford University.

'Who Votes? How and When Negativity Affects Turnout.' Yanna Krupnikov, University of Michigan.

'Who Votes Now?' Jan E. Leighley, University of Arizona and Jonathan Nagler, New York University.

'Redistricting's Effects on Political Participation: The Role of Race and Campaign Activity.' Danny Hayes, Syracuse University and Seth C. McKee, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg.

'Evaluating Theories of Lawmaking Using Bill Support Rates.' Scott Adler, University of Colorado, Boulder and Charles M. Cameron, Princeton University.

'Partisan Signaling and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives.' Jamie L. Carson, University of Georgia; Michael Crespin, University of Georgia and Anthony Madonna, University of Georgia.

'Managing Uncertainty in the U.S. Senate: Procedural Innovation and Routinization.' Richard S. Beth, Congressional Research Archive; Valerie Heitshusen, Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress; Bill Heniff, Jr., Congressional Research Service and Elizabeth Rybicki, Congressional Research Service.

'Legislative Compensation within Parties: A Theory with Evidence.' Jeffery A. Jenkins, University of Virginia and Nathan W. Monroe, University of California, Merced.

'Partisan Polarization, Rules and Legislative Productivity.' Barbara Sinclair, University of California, Los Angeles.

'Beyond ELF: Measuring Economic Differences Across Ethnic Groups.' John D. Huber, Columbia University and Katharine A. Baldwin, Columbia University.

'Risk and Redistribution.' Isabela Mares, Columbia University.

'Partisanship and Policymaking in the Latin America Electricity Sector.' Maria Victoria Murillo, Columbia University and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

'Partisanship and Public Opinion on Policymaking: Comparing Survey Experiments from East and West.' Joshua A. Tucker, New York University and Ted Brader, University of Michigan.

'The Other Great Illusion: The Advantage of Separatism through Economic Integration.' Dawn Brancati, Washington University in St. Louis.

'Conservative Peacemakers: Centre-Right Parties in the Northern Irish and Cypriot Peace Process.' Nukhen Ahu Sandel, University of Southern California and Neophytos Loizides, Queen's University of Belfast.

'Institutional and Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Macedonia: Does it Make a Difference?' Dejan Guzina, Wilfrid Laurier University.

'Revisiting Electoral Engineering: Party Systems and Electoral Reforms in Turkey, Northern Ireland, Guyana, and Sri Lanka.' Evangelos Liaras, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

'International Efforts at Post-conflict Party-building in Divided Societies.' Andrew Radin, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

'Economics or Culture? Motivations for Sub-State Nationalists in Europe.' Seth Kincaid Jolly, Syracuse University.

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'Realignment, Open Seats, the Retirement Slump, and the Appearance of Increasing Incumbency Effect.' Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Syracuse University.

'Risk Taking and Redistricting: How a Party's Willingness to Accept Risk Leads to Seat Gains and Losses.' Aaron Dusso, George Washington University.

'Changing in the Playing Field: Redistricting and Party Competition in the States.' John M. Bruce, University of Mississippi; Jonathan Winburn, University of Mississippi and Robert D. Brown, University of Mississippi.

'The Political Integration of Minorities in New European Democracies: Explaining Variation.' Zsuzsa Csergo, Queen's University.

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'Partyism in New Democracies.' Kenneth F. Greene, University of Texas, Austin.

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'Rules for Dying: Institutions and Party Demise in the Americas.' Jennifer Marle Cyr, Northwestern University and Larkin Terrie, Northwestern University.

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'The Issue Dynamic of the 2008 Presidential Election.' George Rabinowitz, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

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'Examining the Impact of Web 2.0 and Social Media on Political Participation and Civic Engagement in the 2008 Obama campaign.' Derrick L. Cogburn, American University and Fatima K. Espinoza Vasquez, Syracuse University.

'Identity and Group Politics in the 2008 Presidential Campaign Websites.' Kimberly A. Mealy, APSA.

'Cyber activism in the Pre- and Post-Election Period of the Obama Administration.' Jongwoo Han, Syracuse University and Ines A. Mergel, Syracuse University.

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'The Dynamic Relationship Between State Party Organizational Strength and Electoral Success.' Robert C. Lowry, University of Texas, Dallas.

'When Do Party Elites Democratize?: The Direct Primary in Pennsylvania, 1842-1906.' Kaori Shoji, Gakushuin University.

'A Network Analysis of State Party Committee Strength.' Andrew Waugh, University of California, San Diego.

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